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Three - Fragile States, Elites, and Rents in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- Edited by Douglass C. North, Washington University, St Louis, John Joseph Wallis, University of Maryland, College Park, Steven B. Webb, Barry R. Weingast, Stanford University, California
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- Book:
- In the Shadow of Violence
- Published online:
- 05 December 2012
- Print publication:
- 12 November 2012, pp 70-111
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Summary
Introduction
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly Zaire and Belgian Congo, was theater to one of the most extensive post-Cold War wars in Africa, following the collapse in 1997 of the long-standing Mobutu regime. Often seen as the archetypal African kleptocracy, Mobutu’s formal ascension to the presidency in 1965 temporarily stabilized the Congo in the wake of political instability and regional secession attempts following independence in 1960. Throughout various regime phases, natural resource extraction has played a central role in the governance of this vast country of 68 million people and 250 ethnic groups, with four times the area of France and as many as 700 local languages and dialects.
By 2012, the international community had devoted significant resources to the stabilization of the Congo and the government of President Joseph Kabila. Following its initial deployment in 1999, the UN continues to maintain a force of almost twenty thousand troops in the DRC under the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO). Despite its resource wealth, the DRC continues to be subject to large aid. At the same time, concerns linger over poor governance and a predatory civil and military apparatus (including extensive human rights violations and sexual violence), as well as over the army’s inability to defend the country’s population or its international borders. The latter phenomenon is most vividly reflected by instability in the country’s east.
5 - Managing Post-Disaster Reconstruction Finance: International Experience in Public Finance Management
- from Part I - Reconstruction Efforts
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- By Wolfgang Fengler, World Bank in Jakarta, Ahya Ihsan, World Bank Office Jakarta, Kai Kaiser, Public Sector Group, PREM
- Edited by Patrick Daly, R. Michael Feener, Anthony J. S. Reid
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- Book:
- From the Ground Up
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 06 February 2012, pp 79-113
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Summary
INTRODUCTION
The past decade has presented the development community with some of its most demanding reconstruction challenges since the aftermath of World War II. The World Bank and other development partners have been involved in post-disaster reconstruction in response to the devastation resulting from the tsunami in Indonesia (Aceh), Sri Lanka, the Maldives and India, and also from the earthquakes in Pakistan and Indonesia (Yogyakarta/Central Java). The World Bank and its partners have also supported post-conflict reconstruction following peace agreements in Haiti and Sudan. All these activities came in addition to other large-scale reconstruction programmes in Afghanistan, East Timor and several other countries, most recently Lebanon.
In most cases, such disasters greatly exceed available domestic resources. Consequently, international donor agencies are frequently called upon to finance reconstruction in post-disaster and post-conflict countries. In the case of large-scale natural disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami, private contributions were also an important part of the reconstruction programme.
Spending these significant financial resources well has been a key concern in all these reconstruction episodes. Appropriate arrangements for Public Financial Management and Accountability (PFMA) are increasingly viewed as crucial ingredients to ensure that reconstruction proceeds with integrity in a timely and effective manner, while also adequately managing fiduciary risk.
The international community has increasingly emphasized the performance of Public Financial Management (PFM) systems to enhance the use of domestic resources in developing countries and to underpin the scaling up and effectiveness of aid. The strengthening of country financial management systems and donor harmonization have both emerged as key priorities in enhancing aid effectiveness, including through budget support. The recent Public Expenditure & Financial Management Accountability (PEFA) performance indicator framework has focused on benchmarking outcomes as a way of promoting capacity development in the PFMA area.
This chapter focuses on special considerations for strengthening PFM arrangements in post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction environments that have yet to receive systematic attention. This chapter's objective is twofold: (1) to present key features of PFM in post-disaster environments, and (2) to analyse the similarities and differences between PFM in post-disaster and post-conflict environments.
3 - Corruption and Decentralization
- from PART ONE - MONITORING REPORTS & GENERAL ANALYSES
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- By Bert Hofman, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Kai Kaiser, World Bank office at Washington D.C., Günther G. Schulze, International Economic Policy, Freiburg University, Germany
- Edited by Coen J. G. Holtzappel, Martin Ramstedt
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- Book:
- Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 05 November 2009, pp 99-113
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Summary
INDONESIA'S DECENTRALIZATION
Indonesia is rapidly moving from a highly centralized system of government to a largely decentralized one (World Bank 2003a). Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Governance devolves most functions except for national defence, international relations, justice, police, monetary policy, religion, and finance. The local governments are obliged to perform a set of key functions, including health, education, environmental and infrastructure services, and can perform any function not explicitly reserved for the centre or the provinces. The province has only a minor role, mainly in coordination, and backstopping rural regencies and urban municipalities that cannot yet perform their functions. The province will also continue to perform deconcentrated central tasks, including supervision, on behalf of the central government.
Law No. 25/1999 sets out a revised inter-governmental fiscal framework. Through the introduction of a general allocation grant (dana alokasi umum, DAU) and stipulations on shared taxes and local tax bases, the system significantly increases financing for local governments. Moreover, it also moves largely away from the former system of subsidy for autonomous regions (Subsidi Daerah Otonom, SDO), and presidential instruction (Instruksi Presiden, INPRES) grants characterized by a high degree of earmarking and centralized control. Regional governments are now responsible for local public service delivery in areas previously executed directly by the central government through its deconcentrated regional agencies and civil servants. The deconcentrated agencies in the decentralized sectors have been largely merged into the local government apparatuses (pemerintah daerah, PEMDA), and over half of Indonesia's civil service — 2.1 million people — have been transferred to the local governments. While government spending has been regionalized to a substantial degree, taxation remains largely centralized and the regions depend in their financing on central government allocations.
The on-going decentralization process will bring about a fundamental change in the organization and functioning of Indonesia's government. It will also bring in new actors that are, at least in principle, accountable to their local electorate. The question that arises is how these changes will affect the quality of governance in general and the level and structure of corruption in particular. While it is far too early to give definite answers, we can identify the channels through which decentralization will affect the quality of governance and the extent of red tape and corruption in the regions. Moreover, there is some preliminary evidence on some changes in corruption following the devolution of authority towards lower levels of government.